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Abstract
Background: Explanations for the current worldwide financial crisis are primarily provided by economists and politicians.
However, in the present work we focus on the psychological-cognitive factors that most likely affect the thinking of people
on the economic stage and thus might also have had an effect on the progression of the crises. One of these factors might
be the effect of prior beliefs on reasoning and decision-making. So far, this question has been explored only to a limited
extent.
Methods: We report two experiments on logical reasoning competences of nineteen stock-brokers with long-lasting
vocational experiences at the stock market. The premises of reasoning problems concerned stock trading and the
experiments varied whether or not their conclusions—a proposition which is reached after considering the premises—
agreed with the brokers’ prior beliefs. Half of the problems had a conclusion that was highly plausible for stock-brokers
while the other half had a highly implausible conclusion.
Results: The data show a strong belief bias. Stock-brokers were strongly biased by their prior knowledge. Lowest
performance was found for inferences in which the problems caused a conflict between logical validity and the experts’
belief. In these cases, the stock-brokers tended to make logically invalid inferences rather than give up their existing beliefs.
Conclusions: Our findings support the thesis that cognitive factors have an effect on the decision-making on the financial
market. In the present study, stock-brokers were guided more by past experience and existing beliefs than by logical
thinking and rational decision-making. They had difficulties to disengage themselves from vastly anchored thinking
patterns. However, we believe, that it is wrong to accuse the brokers for their ‘‘malfunctions’’, because such hard-wired
cognitive principles are difficult to suppress even if the person is aware of them.
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Introduction
Beginning in 2007 and continuing through the years 2008 to
2010 the finical markets around the world experienced the first
crisis of the new millennium. The crunch was caused by a
subprime mortgage crisis in the United States and many
malfunctions of the financial systems around the globe. The result
of the crash was that between January and October 2008, stock
owners in the U.S. had suffered about $8 trillion in losses and
losses in other countries have averaged about 40% (Wall Street
Journal, October 11, 2008, p.1). How could that happen? In the
media mainly economists and politicians voice their opinion on the
causes of and possible solutions for the crisis and try to explain the
breakdown, for instance, as a result of a globalized world or
attribute it to greediness and moral irresponsibility of the people in
charge. In support of the latter assertion, The Economist titled an
article on the future of the financial markets ‘‘Greed—and Fear’’
(The Economist, January 24, 2009) and the Frankfurter Allge-
meine Zeitung, the leading newspaper in Germany, under the
rubric ‘‘glossary of the crises’’ entitled an article on the most
popular explanations for the crisis with a single word: Gier (engl.
‘‘Greed’’; FAZ, May 12, 2009).
While in the public discourse greed and immorality are very
popular psychological concepts to explain the financial break-
down, other psychological factors that probably caused or, at least,
triggered the crises are almost completely neglected.
In the present work we focus on the cognitive factors that most
likely affect the thinking of people on the economic stage and thus
might also have had an effect on the progression of the crises. The
main assumption of the paper is that fatal decisions and
inappropriate actions on the finical market can also be caused
by the ‘‘natural’’ and almost ‘‘hard-wired’’ limitations of the
human cognitive system. An important factor in this context might
be the effect of prior knowledge and existing beliefs. Experts in a
certain domain typically possess domain-specific skills and
knowledge that distinguish them from novices and less experienced
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problems more quickly and more accurately than laymen [1,2].
They analyse a given problem in different ways than non-experts
and use different cognitive strategies to solve problems compared
to novices [3,4]. Typically, this results in better performance of the
experts (for an overview on the psychology of expertise see [5,6])
and often results in their enormous salaries.
However, prior knowledge and existing beliefs can also be a
drawback in reasoning and decision-making. When we are an
expert in a specific domain and we are convinced that something is
true, we often have serious problems in changing our mind in
situations where what we think is true is actually wrong. It is
difficult to detect the inconsistency of our prior experiences and
knowledge with the current situation and it also proves hard to
revise our beliefs in order to take a new piece of information into
account. Findings from cognitive brain research also provide
evidence that reasoning with knowledge-related problems is
implemented in other brain areas than reasoning with abstract
materials with no meaningful content [7,8]. Reasoning in general
activates a large bilateral network including occipital, parietal,
temporal and frontal lobes, basal ganglia, and cerebellar regions.
Which of these areas are involved highly depends on the type of
the problems we are confronted with [9–12]. In particular, further
investigations reveal that reasoning about problems related to
prior beliefs activates a left frontal (BA 47) temporal (BA 21/22)
system, whereas reasoning about problems in unfamiliar domains
activates bilateral parietal lobes (BA 7, 40) and dorsal PFC (BA 6).
One of the most impressive findings in this context is the belief
bias [13]. A belief bias typically occurs when prior knowledge
significantly influences how a reasoning problem is solved.
Technically speaking, a logically valid inference is one whose
conclusion is true in every case in which all its premises are true
[14]. However, the conclusion of such an inference can be true or
false in relation to our prior knowledge. If the conclusion is true
with respect to our prior knowledge the inference is supported. If it
is false in relation to our prior knowledge the inference is more
difficult, which means that it results in more errors or longer
decision times.
Goel and Dolan [7] also identified the neural basis of the belief
bias. They brought logic reasoning and beliefs into conflict and
found evidence for the engagement of a left temporal lobe system
during belief-based reasoning and a bilateral parietal lobe system
during belief-neutral reasoning. Activation of the right prefrontal
cortex was found when the participants inhibited a response
associated with belief bias and correctly completed a logical task.
When logical reasoning, in contrast, was overwritten by a belief
bias, there was engagement of the ventral medial prefrontal cortex,
a region implicated in affective processing.
The present contribution explored how stock-brokers perform
when they are confronted with problems that evoke a clash
between their prior beliefs and what would be a logically valid
inference. Particularly, we were interested in problems where a
conflict occurred between what the brokers have known to be true
as a general rule for calculating stock prices and what a logically
correct inference would be.
Methods
Ethics statement
The experiments reported here were done in accordance with
the Declaration of Helsinki and followed the ethical requirements
of the German Psychological Association (DGPs). No extra ethical
approval was required for this study, since the material was
harmless and dealt with work content of stock-brokers. Partici-
pants were informed that their data is treated anonymously and
that they could terminate the experiment at any time without
providing any reason. All participants provided informed written
consent.
Experiment 1
Participants. Nineteen experienced stock-brokers (with the
majority having over ten years of experience on the trading floor),
working in large finance companies on the Frankfurt stock market,
were tested. Their age ranged between 24 and 65 years.
Materials and procedure. The experiment was conducted
on a laptop computer that presented the problems and recorded
participants’ responses. The stock-brokers judged the validity of 24
logical inference problems concerning sales transactions and
calculating stock prices (Figure 1 top). This content was
integrated into reasoning problems that consisted of two
premises and one conclusion. The premises are the statements
that the participants had to take for granted (although they might
conflict with their prior knowledge) and the conclusion was the
statement that had to be deducted from the premises. All problems
were conditional inferences, consisting of an ‘‘if A then B’’
construct that posits B to be true if A is true. The four common
inference problems were used: Modus Ponens (MP), Modus
Tollens (MT), Denial of the Antecedent (DA), and Affirmation of
the Consequent (AC). Logically, only MP (if a then b; a; b) and
MT (if a then b; not-b; not-a) are valid inferences, whereas DA (if a
then b; not-a; not-b) and AC (if a then b; b; a) are logically invalid
[10]. Although we did not predict specific differences between the
different types of inferences, we used MP, MT, DA, and AC
Figure 1. Design of the Experiment. Sample item showing an
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content of the problem and also to design our material in
accordance with the standards in reasoning research. The
participants were instructed to use the normal interpretation of
conditionals, i.e., not to interpret them as biconditional (which
would make the DA, and AC inferences logically valid, too). The
formal validity of an inference was checked against the laws of
formal logic that allows to exactly determine what is logically valid.
Participants’ decisions were analysed with respect to logical
correctness and agreement with the experts’ knowledge. They
had to decide whether or not the conclusion logically followed
from the premises (by pressing associated keys on a keyboard).
Most important, while the content of the problems always
concerned stock trading, the plausibility of the inference
problems was systematically varied. Half of the problems
contained a conclusion that was highly plausible for stock-
brokers while the other half led to a highly implausible one.
Four groups of inferences were obtained by combining logicality
and plausibility: ‘‘valid-plausible’’, ‘‘invalid-implausible’’, ‘‘valid-
implausible’’, and ‘‘invalid-plausible’’. Note the conflict between
logicality and plausibility in the latter two types, while no such
conflict appeared in the first two (Figure 1 bottom). Plausibility of
the conclusions was related to the rules of calculating stock prices
at the Frankfurt stock exchange (http://www.boerse-frankfurt.
de/DE/index.aspx?pageID=44&NewsID=99). Neutral problems
(valid/invalid) were included as controls. The main question of
interest was ‘what goes on in the mind of a stock-broker when a
conclusion is logically correct, but conflicts with what the stock-
brokers believes to be a correct deduction (valid-implausible) or is
logically incorrect but highly plausible (invalid-plausible)?’
Experiment 2
Participants. As a control, a group of 19 meteorologists from
the German Meteorological Service was tested. They were
matched (age, education, expertise in their profession) to the
group of stock-brokers. They were all naı ¨ve with respect to the
stock exchange market. All provided informed written consent.
Materials and procedure. Inference problems, task, and
procedure were identical to Experiment 1.
Results
Experiment 1
Overall, almost half of the problems were solved incorrectly
(51% errors overall). A 362 ANOVA was run to test our
hypotheses that there should be a main effect of validity and–most
importantly–an interaction between validity and plausibility. This
analysis indeed revealed a significant main effect of Validity,
F(1,18)=15.684, p,.001, indicating that stock-brokers made
more errors in evaluating invalid than valid problems, and a
significant Validity 6 Plausibility interaction, F(2,36)=16.951,
p,.001 (there was no main effect of Plausibility, F(2,36)=0.014,
p=.986 n.s.). To further test our hypotheses concerning the effect
of plausibility on reasoning we then performed paired-samples t-
tests as post-hoc tests. These showed that with valid problems,
stock-brokers made significantly more errors when the content was
implausible (M=56.6%; SD=4.20) than when it was plausible
(M=23.7%; SD=4.47), t (18)=25.43; p,.01; r=0.79. With
invalid problems, however, stock-brokers made more errors when
the content was plausible (M=77.6%; SD=5.02) than when it
was implausible (M=42.1%; SD=5.15), t (18)=4.15; p,.01;
r=0.69. This shows that the stock-brokers were biased towards
accepting logically invalid inferences as valid if the inference was
‘economically’ plausible (Figure 2 left).
Experiment 2
A3 62 ANOVA detected a main effect of Validity, F
(1,18)=6.94, p=.017, reflecting a higher error rate with invalid
than with valid problems. No significant effect of Plausibility
emerged, F(2,36)=0.084, p=.92 n.s.. Also, there was no
Figure 2. Results of Experiment 1 and 2. Error rates for the stock-brokers (left) and the control group of meteorologists (right). Error bars denote
the standard errors (SEM).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0013483.g002
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p=.969 n.s.. In other words, no bias towards accepting logically
invalid inferences as valid –if the inference was ‘economically’
plausible– occurred (Figure 2 right).
Overall Analysis of the Plausibility Effects
The two experiments only differed in having different groups of
participants. The participants of Experiment 1 were experienced
stock-brokers, whereas the participants in Experiment 2 served as
controls. It is important to see that this actually is not a variation in
expertise in the sense that we compared experts to low-
experienced stock traders as it is often done in the field of
expertise research. In fact, the participants in Experiment 2
primarily served as controls to make sure that the pattern of results
in Experiment 1 (stock-brokers) was not caused by other variables
in our experimental materials. However, in both experiments,
validity and plausibility were used as within-subjects factors and
we demonstrated that stock-brokers show a decrement in
performance with implausible compared to the plausible infer-
ences, whereas the control group was not affected by the
conclusions’ plausibility. We did not treat the experiments as a
single study with the two different groups of participants as a
between-subjects factor, because a conjoint analysis would result in
problems with the inhomogeneity of variance. However, a direct
interaction between the two groups of participants (brokers and
controls) and the different sorts of problems would provide
additional support for our account. Therefore, we computed a
post hoc ANOVA with ‘‘plausibility’’ as a within-subjects factor
and the two experiments as a between-subjects factor. In this way,
it is possible to estimate whether the pattern of performance is
different for brokers and control participants. Figure 3 summarizes
how the plausibility affected reasoning accuracy in the two groups
of participants. As indicated by the single experiments, stock-
brokers indeed show a significantly different pattern of perfor-
mance across the different groups of problems. Accordingly, the
ANOVA did not show main effects of Validity, F(1,36)=0.82;
p..05 and Plausibility F(2,72)=0.00; p..05, but, there was, as we
predicted, a significant interaction between the two factors,
F(2,72)=13.05; p,.01. This shows that the patterns of perfor-
mance were in fact different for brokers and control participants.
Discussion
We conducted –in spring 2008, just before the current financial
crises started– a study on logical reasoning at the stock market.
In particular, we predicted that stock-brokers should show a
belief bias whenever there was a conflict between logicality and
plausibility. In contrast, we predicted that people with no special
experience at the stock market (our control group were
meteorologists) should not be sensitive to the implausibility of
the reasoning problems’ content and thus should not show a belief
bias.
Our findings support our hypotheses. Stock-brokers were
guided more by prior knowledge and existing beliefs than by
logic and rational decision-making. In fact, they often tended to
Figure 3. Influence of plausibility. Error rates for the stock-brokers and the control group for the four different inferences (MP, MT, DA, AC) for
each condition (valid-plausible, valid-implausible, valid-neutral, invalid-plausible, invalid-implausible, invalid-neutral).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0013483.g003
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Thus, they had difficulties to disengage themselves from vastly
anchored thinking patterns and instead demonstrated the well-
known belief bias [13]. Interestingly, the absence of logical
thinking was most clearly noticeable when the stock-brokers were
challenged to judge conclusions that were logically incorrect but
were in line with their beliefs. In these cases, they made many
incorrect decisions, which were also accompanied by longer
decision times (not reported here). Their performance was even
inferior to that of a control group of meteorologists who had no
experience at all with the stock market. However, it should also be
mentioned that although the performance of stock-brokers on
logical reasoning problems were poor when these tasks caused a
conflict between their expert knowledge and the logically valid
inference, their performance was actually superior to that of the
control group when the inference is both logically valid and in line
with their expert knowledge.
How are our results related to different reasoning theories? Our
experiments were not designed to test competing reasoning
theories and so the following thoughts must be taken with caution.
However, there are three possible explanations for why stock-
brokers show such a belief bias and thus a strong tendency to
deviate from the rules of logic.
(1) The classical heuristics-and-biases program [15] assumes
that people use heuristics to deal with the limitations of the
cognitive system, leading to systematic errors and lapses of
reasoning that point to human irrationality. A modern version of
this account is given by the fast and frugal heuristic [16].
Gigerenzer and Goldstein [16] question whether deviations from
the formal norms of logic and probability theory must be deemed
as ‘‘errors‘‘ or ‘‘biases’’. Within this approach the decisions of our
participants may be considered (ecologically) rational to the extent
that the heuristics used are adapted to the task environment [17].
Although we agree that this approach can explain some empirical
findings, we do not believe that it is helpful in the present context.
As Dougherty and others argued the models of fast and frugal
heuristics have been too vaguely specified and also do not explain
how general-purpose logical skills and domain-specific knowledge
(or cues) interact [18].
(2) Our findings are also in line with dual-process theories of
reasoning. They explain belief biases in reasoning due to the
involvement of different cognitive processes and imply a specific
relation between logic and human reasoning. Evans [19] claims
that two cognitive systems exist of which one is a ‘‘logical’’
system (slow, requires deliberative control; system 2) and the
other is ‘‘non-logical’’ (fast, not consciously accessible; system 1).
While the logical system is isolated from knowledge and
available to conscious reflection, the other is not isolated from
knowledge and can lead us into reasoning errors. Belief biases
occur because the system 1 dominates system 2 when the
problem is related to individuals’ prior knowledge or beliefs.
However, there are some shortcomings in this theory that
prevent us from accepting it as an explanation for our data. For
instance, it postulates loose dichotomies of systems without
defining the computations that are performed by them [17,20].
Other severe problems with dual-process accounts are described,
for instance, in [21,22].
(3) What we believe might be the most promising explanation is
the theory of preferred mental models [23–26]. The preferred
models theory is based on the classical mental model theory by
Johnson-Laird and collaborators [27,28], but makes some
additional assumptions concerning the construction, inspection,
and validation of mental models that capture the state of affairs
described in the premises. In both accounts the models are
mental simulations of the problem from which a solution can be
developed. However, in the classical model theory, it is assumed
that reasoners can use their working memory to carry out
recursive processes in order to construct all possible mental
models (for an evaluation of this account see [29]). The preferred
mental model theory, in contrast, disbelieves that people are able
to account for all possible models (solutions) a problem might
have. Instead, according to the theory, people typically focus on a
single model –the preferred mental model– and ignore alterna-
tives which are also logically valid. The reason is that the
preferred model is easier to construct and more effortlessly to
maintain and to process in working memory [26]. This effect
seems to be even stronger in experts, because experts routinely
consider a solution (model) that was successful in former
situations, but frequently do not again check its validity in the
current situation. Therefore, alternatives to the standard solution
–the preferred model– are difficult to consider. This saves
cognitive capacities, but makes it difficult to flexibly and
rationally respond to new tasks with new solutions. This account
must be tested in further experiments.
Corollaries and Consequences
The main motivation for our study was to explore the
interaction between prior beliefs and logical reasoning. Our
sample consisted of a group of experienced stock-brokers (and a
control group) and the task was to evaluate inferences concerning
stock trades. Our main finding was a strong belief bias. Stock-
brokers were strongly biased by their prior knowledge. Lowest
performance was found for decisions in which the problems caused
a conflict between logical validity and prior knowledge. Stock-
brokers tended to make logically invalid inferences rather than
give up their existing beliefs.
We think that these findings also have some implications for the
current financial crisis. Of course, such transformations from the
psychological lab into the real world are highly speculative and in
fact it is questionable whether individuals’ belief biases can cause
aggregate effects on a macroeconomic level. On the other hand,
we also believe that Cognitive Psychology should not completely
abandon to apply experimental findings to the real world and to
improve our understanding of it. So, our interpretation of the
study is that, amongst others, also psychological mechanisms exist
that can help us understand some aspects of financial breakdowns.
‘‘Greed’’ probably is a less important factor than many people
think. In fact, research from Cognitive Neuroscience has shown
that reasoning with familiar and unfamiliar problems is related to
specific patterns of brain activity and the belief bias can be seen as
a conflict between brain areas in which either domain-general or
knowledge-driven reasoning strategies are implemented [7,9–12].
One lesson from our study is that such neuro-cognitive principles
that influence human thinking might also be effective at the stock
market. So, to accuse the brokers for their ‘‘malfunctions’’ is
probably wrong, because such hard-wired principles are difficult to
suppress even if the person is aware of them [13,19,28,30].
Moreover, logical reasoning is not the most important competence
at the stock market. Domain-specific knowledge and beliefs are
what makes an expert successful under normal conditions and
maybe the current financial crisis would be much more disastrous
without the long-lasting experience of the brokers. A second
lesson, however, is that it is naı ¨ve to trust in the self-regulation of
the financial market. From a psychological point of view, we need
effective control mechanisms, since the reasoning of economic
people (and all other human beings) is error-prone and often
irrational.
Illogicality of Stock-Brokers
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